On a class of solidarity values

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Recently, Dr. André Casajus and Dr. Frank Huettner from HHL’s Chair of Economics and Information Systems have published a new articel in the European Journal of Operational Research. The authors‘ research deals with the distribution of gains from cooperation. In recent years, they have focused on the systematic implementation of aspects of solidarity. To this end, this article proposes and investigates a new general allocation rule.

Casajus, A., & Huettner, F. (2014), On a class of solidarity values, in: European Journal of Operational Research, 236 (2), 583-591.

Abstract: We suggest a new one-parameter family of solidarity values for TU-games. The members of this class are distinguished by the type of player whose removal from a game does not affect the remaining players’ payoffs. While the Shapley value and the equal division value are the boundary members of this family, the solidarity value is its center. With exception of the Shapley value, all members of this family are asymptotically equivalent to the equal division value in the sense of Radzik (2013).